The field of ethics, also called moral
philosophy, involves systematizing, defending, and
recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior.
Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three
general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and
applied ethics. Metaethics investigates where our
ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they
merely social inventions? Do they involve more than
expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to
these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the
will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the
meaning of ethical terms themselves. Normative ethics
takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral
standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. This may
involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire,
the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our
behavior on others. Finally, applied ethics involves
examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion,
infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns,
homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war. By using
the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics,
discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these
controversial issues. The lines of distinction between
metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often
blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied
ethical topic since it involves a specific type of
controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general
normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the
right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the
morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on
metaethical issues such as, "where do rights come from?" and
"what kind of beings have rights?"
Table of Contents
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this article)
1.
Metaethics
The term "meta" means after or beyond, and,
consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or
bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define
metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical
concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied
ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined
area of moral philosophy. Two issues, though, are prominent:
(1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality
exists independently of humans, and (2) psychological
issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral
judgments and conduct.
1a. Metaphysical Issues:
Objectivism and Relativism
"Metaphysics" is the study of the kinds of things that
exist in the universe. Some things in the universe are made of
physical stuff, such as rocks; and perhaps other things are
nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods.
The metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering
specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that
exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions.
There are two general directions that discussions of this
topic take, one other-worldly and one
this-worldly. Proponents of the "other-worldly" view
typically hold that moral values are objective in the sense
that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human
conventions. They also hold that they are absolute, or
eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are
universal insofar as they apply to all rational creatures
around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic
example of this view is Plato, who was inspired by the field
of mathematics. When we look at numbers and mathematical
relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts
that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe.
Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them.
Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by
stating that they are abstract entities that exist in a
spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are
absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like
entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are spiritual
objects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all
moral principles together under the heading of "eternal law"
which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects.
17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke
described them as spirit-like relationships rather than
spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a
sprit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the
metaphysical status of morality is divine commands
issuing from God's will. Sometimes called voluntarism,
this view was inspired by the notion of an all-powerful God
who is in control of everything. God simply wills things, and
they become reality. He wills the physical world into
existence, he wills human life into existence and, similarly,
he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this
view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe
that God wills moral principles, such as "murder is wrong,"
and these exist in God's mind as commands. God informs humans
of these commands by implanting us with moral intuitions or
revealing these commands in scripture.
The second and more this-worldly approach to the
metaphysical status of morality follows in the skeptical
philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek
philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status
of moral values. Technically skeptics did not reject moral
values themselves, but only denied that values exist as
spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God.
Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a
position that has since been called moral relativism.
There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is
individual relativism, which holds that individual
people create their own moral standards. Friedrich Nietzsche,
for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her
morality distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value
system of the masses. The second is cultural relativism
which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval of
one's society - and not simply in the preferences of
individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in
more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham
Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism and relativism,
"this-worldly" approaches to the metaphysical status of
morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality
and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society
to society throughout time and throughout the world. They
frequently attempt to defend their position by citing examples
of values that differ dramatically from one culture to
another, such as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and
human sacrifice.
b. Psychological Issues in
Metaethics
A second area of metaethics involves the psychological
basis of our moral judgments and conduct, particularly
understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore
this subject by asking the simple question, "Why be moral?"
Even if I am aware of basic moral standards, such as don't
kill and don’t steal, this does not necessarily mean that I
will be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some answers
to the question "Why be moral?" are to avoid punishment, to
gain praise, to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit
in with society.
i. Egoism and Altruism
One important area of moral psychology concerns the
inherent selfishness of humans. 17th century
British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all,
of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an
action seems selfless, such as donating to charity, there are
still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing power over
other people. This view is called psychological egoism
and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate
all human actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is
a view called psychological hedonism which is the view
that pleasure is the specific driving force behind all
of our actions. 18th century British philosopher
Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure
prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we
also have an inherent psychological capacity to show
benevolence to others. This view is called psychological
altruism and maintains that at least some of our actions
are motivated by instinctive benevolence.
ii. Emotion and
Reason
A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute
concerning the role of reason in motivating moral actions. If,
for example, I make the statement "abortion is morally wrong,"
am I making a rational assessment or only expressing my
feelings? On the one side of the dispute, 18th
century British philosopher David Hume argued that moral
assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can
amass all the reasons we want, but that alone will not
constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional
reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement. Reason might
be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume's
words, "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the
passions." Inspired by Hume's anti-rationalist views, some
20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly
denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For
example, although the statement "it is good to donate to
charity" may on the surface look as though it is a factual
description about charity, it is not. Instead, a moral
utterance like this involves two things. First, I (the
speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of approval
about charitable donations and I am in essence saying "Hooray
for charity!" This is called the emotive element
insofar as I am expressing my emotions about some specific
behavior. . Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to
donate to charity and am essentially giving the command,
"Donate to charity!" This is called the prescriptive
element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific
behavior.
From Hume's day forward, more rationally-minded
philosophers have opposed these emotive theories of ethics and
instead argued that moral assessments are indeed acts of
reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel
Kant is a case in point. Although emotional factors often do
influence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless
resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is
motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and
desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier,
was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and
prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more
broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes
place when making moral choices. All of our moral choices are,
or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If
I claim that it is wrong to steal someone's car, then I should
be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For
example, I could argue that stealing Smith's car is wrong
since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or
put the thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier,
then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best
reasons in support of one course of action versus
another.
iii. Male and Female Morality
A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there
is a distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in
the psychological differences between men and women.
Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional
morality is male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female
perspective of the world which can be shaped into a value
theory. According to many feminist philosophers, traditional
morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices
that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring
property, engaging in business contracts, and governing
societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and
government were then taken as models for the creation of
equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights
and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a
nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic
life. These tasks require less rule following, and more
spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience
as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would
be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in
each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes
part of the situation and acts caringly within that context.
This stands in contrast with male-modeled morality where the
agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty,
but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the situation.
A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called,
is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for
or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.
2. Normative Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that
regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search
for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule
is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to
others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not
want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to
steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was
starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this
same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any
possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden
Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass,
victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an
example of a normative theory that establishes a single
principle against which we judge all actions. Other
normative theories focus on a set of foundational
principles, or a set of good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is
only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether
it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies
will be noted here: (1) virtue theories, (2) duty theories,
and (3) consequentialist theories.
a. Virtue
Theories
Many philosophers believe that morality consists of
following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't
kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules,
and then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules.
Virtue theorists, however, place less emphasis on learning
rules, and instead stress the importance of developing good
habits of character, such as benevolence. Once I've
acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act
in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one of
the oldest normative traditions in Western philosophy, having
its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four
virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal
virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other
important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect,
good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good
habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should
avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as
cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory
emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are
developed in one's youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible
for instilling virtues in the young.
Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we
acquire, which regulate our emotions. For example, in response
to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of
courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger.
Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most
virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits.
With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I
develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I
have too much courage I develop the disposition of rashness
which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an
easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character
traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do
this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek
lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or theological
virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue
theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the
19th century with the rise of alternative moral
theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue
theory received special attention from philosophers who
believed that more recent approaches ethical theories were
misguided for focusing too heavily on rules and actions,
rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre
defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and
argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within
social traditions.
b. Duty Theories
Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as
human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not
commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific,
foundational principles of obligation. These theories are
sometimes called deontological, from the Greek word
deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of
our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called
nonconsequentialist since these principles are
obligatory, irrespective of the consequences that might follow
from our actions. For example, it is wrong to not care for our
children even if it results in some great benefit, such as
financial savings. There are four central duty theories.
The first is that championed by 17th century German
philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties
under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and
duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued
that there are two kinds: (1) a theoretical duty to know the
existence and nature of God, and (2) a practical duty to both
inwardly and outwardly worship God. Concerning our duties
towards oneself, these are also of two sorts: (1) duties of
the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents,
and (2) duties of the body, which involve not harming our
bodies, as we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not
killing oneself. Concerning our duties towards others,
Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are
universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which
are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties
are of three sorts: (1) avoid wronging others; (2) treat
people as equals, and (3) promote the good of others.
Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the
principal one of which is the duty is to keep one's promises.
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights
theory. Most generally, a "right" is a justified claim
against another person's behavior - such as my right to not be
harmed by you. Rights and duties are related in such a way
that the rights of one person implies the duties of another
person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by
Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This is called the
correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early
account of rights theory is that of 17th century
British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of
nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health,
liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural
rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the United States
Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson
recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists
maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from
these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and
religious expression. There are four features traditionally
associated with moral rights. First, rights are natural
insofar as they are not invented or created by governments.
Second, they are universal insofar as they do not
change from country to country. Third, they are equal
in the sense that rights are the same for all people,
irrespective of gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are
inalienable which means that I ca not hand over my
rights to another person, such as by selling myself into
slavery.
A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes
a single principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant
agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such
as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to
others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational
principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It
is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls
the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he
argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical
imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that we have,
for example, "If you want to get a good job, then you ought to
go to college." By contrast, a categorical imperative simply
mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal desires,
such as "You ought to do X." Kant gives at least four versions
of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct:
Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That
is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use
them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end
whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value
of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally
correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the
recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end
whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something
else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's car
since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness.
The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of
actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example,
would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to
the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality
of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single
principle of duty.
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by
British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes prima
facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts,
Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental
nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is
much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral
convictions:
Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm
them
Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
Justice: the duty to recognize merit
Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of
others
Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and
intelligence
Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others
Ross recognizes that situations will arise
when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a
classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor's gun and
promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of
rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so
that he can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the
duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other
hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid
injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to
Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is my
actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima
facie duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence
emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun.
c. Consequentialist
Theories
It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility
by weighing the consequences of our actions. According to
consequentialist normative theories, correct moral conduct is
determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an
action's consequences:
Consequentialism: An action is morally right if
the consequences of that action are more favorable than
unfavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we first
tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second,
we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh
the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are
greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad
consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper.
Consequentialist theories are sometimes called
teleological theories, from the Greek word
telos, or end, since the end result of the action is
the sole determining factor of its morality.
Consequentialist theories became popular in the
18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way
to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather
than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of
questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of
consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable
consequences of actions. Most versions of consequentialism are
more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In
particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which
consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three
subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:
Ethical Egoism:an action is morally right if the
consequences of that action are more favorable than
unfavorable only to the agent performing the
action.
Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if
the consequences of that action are more favorable than
unfavorable to everyone except the
agent.
Utilitarianism: an action is morally
right if the consequences of that action are more favorable
than unfavorable to everyone.
All three of these theories focus on the consequences of
actions for different groups of people. But, like all
normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of
each other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider
the following example. A woman was traveling through a
developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her
run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the
hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the
driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down
the road the driver explained that in his country if someone
assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the
assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the
victim dies, then the assisting person could be held
responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining
that road accident victims are therefore usually left
unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh
desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the
woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the
consequences of her attempted assistance as she would
be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the
morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism,
she would be concerned only with the consequences of her
action as others are affected, particularly the
accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that
assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice,
irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her.
On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the
consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here
is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate
the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her
action.
i. Types of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully
developed systems of utilitarianism. Two features of his
theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally
the consequences of each action we perform and thereby
determine on a case by case basis whether an action is morally
right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as
act-utilitiarianism. Second, Bentham also proposed that
we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions.
For Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that
matter in determining whether our conduct is moral. This
aspect of Bentham's theory is known as hedonistic
utilitarianism. Critics point out limitations in both of
these aspects.
First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally
wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching
television, since our time could be spent in ways that
produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work. But
prohibiting leisure activities doesn't seem reasonable. More
significantly, according to act-utilitarianism, specific acts
of torture or slavery would be morally permissible if the
social benefit of these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A
revised version of utilitarianism called
rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According
to rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally
right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act
utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences of each
particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test
only for the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is
wrong." Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more
favorable consequences than unfavorable consequences for
everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or
murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered
method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as
stealing my neighbor's car, is judged wrong since it violates
a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is
morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable
consequences for everyone. John Stuart Mill's version of
utilitarianism is rule-oriented.
Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable
consequences are the only factors that matter, morally
speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores
other morally significant consequences that are not
necessarily pleasing or painful. For example, acts which
foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they are not
always pleasing. In response to this problem, G.E. Moore
proposed ideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying
any consequence that we intuitively recognize as good or bad
(and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare
proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves
tallying any consequence that fulfills our
preferences.
ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract
Theory
We have seen that Thomas Hobbes was an advocate of the
methaethical theory of psychological egoism - the view that
all of our actions are selfishly motivated. Upon that
foundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as
social contract theory, which is a type of
rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish
reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral
rules than one without moral rules. For without moral rules,
we are subject to the whims of other people's selfish
interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are
at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore motivate
each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow for
a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would
include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing.
However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if
the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would
plunder our neighbors' property once their guards were down.
Each agent would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore,
for selfish reasons alone, we devise a means of enforcing
these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes us if
we violate these rules.
3. Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of
the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as
abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years
applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient
groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental
ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two features
are necessary for an issue to be considered an "applied
ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in
the sense that there are significant groups of people both for
and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting,
for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone
agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the
issue of gun control would be an applied ethical issue since
there are significant groups of people both for and against
gun control.
The second requirement for in issue to be an applied
ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On
any given day, the media presents us with an array of
sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in
the military, involuntary commitment of the mentally impaired,
capitalistic vs. socialistic business practices, public vs.
private health care systems, or energy conservation. Although
all of these issues are controversial and have an important
impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are
only issues of social policy. The aim of social policy is to
help make a given society run efficiently by devising
conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes.
Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory
practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not
confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social
policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both
socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of
issues are often distinct. For example, many people would
argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel
that there should be social policies regulating sexual
conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some
social policies forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from
having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not
offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident
having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to
qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more
than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as
well.
In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues
should be easy. With the issue of abortion, for example, we
would simply determine its morality by consulting our
normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If
a given abortion produces greater benefit than disbenefit,
then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally
acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are
perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to
choose, many of which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the
stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories
prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for
determining the morality of a specific issue. The usual
solution today to this stalemate is to consult several
representative normative principles on a given issue and see
where the weight of the evidence lies.
a. Normative Principles in
Applied Ethics
Arriving at a short list of representative normative
principles is itself a challenging task. The principles
selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version
of act-egoism that might focus only on an action's short-term
benefit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by
people on both sides of an applied ethical issue. For this
reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not usually
cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged
in the debate. The following principles are the ones most
commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:
Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an
action produces beneficial consequences for the individual in
question.
Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action
produces beneficial consequences for society.
Principle of benevolence: help those in need.
Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their
best interests when they cannot do so themselves.
Principle of harm: do not harm others.
Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.
Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.
Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person's freedom over
his/her actions or physical body.
Principle of justice: acknowledge a person's right to due
process, fair compensation for harm done, and fair
distribution of benefits.
Rights: acknowledge a person's rights to life,
information, privacy, free expression, and safety.
The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional
normative principles and are derived from both
consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The first two
principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are
consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences of an
action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining
principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence,
paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties
we have toward others. The principles of autonomy, justice,
and the various rights are based on moral rights.
An example will help illustrate the function of these
principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982 a couple
from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a severely retarded
baby. The infant, known as Baby Doe, also had its stomach
disconnected from its throat and was thus unable to receive
nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable
through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely
retarded child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and
water for the infant. Local courts supported the parents'
decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective
surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor
of corrective surgery derive from the infant's right to life
and the principle of paternalism which stipulates that we
should pursue the best interests of others when they are
incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective
surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which
would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its
quality of life would have been poor and in any case it
probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the
parent's perspective, Baby Doe's survival would have been a
significant emotional and financial burden. When examining
both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts concluded
that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the
arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be
in the best interests of the infant, given the poor quality of
life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe's right
to life was not clear given the severity of the infant's
mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more
than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions
must also be present. The issue here involves what is often
referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many
applied ethical discussions.
b. Issues in Applied
Ethics
As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by
ethicists today, some of which will be briefly mentioned here.
Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in
clinical settings. Health care workers are in an unusual
position of continually dealing with life and death
situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics
issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas of
applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of
surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the
status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues
arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities,
such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the
physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying
patients. The AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of
the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether
physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional
issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality
of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the mentally
retarded. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality
of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention,
physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.
The field of business ethics examines moral controversies
relating to the social responsibilities of capitalist business
practices, the moral status of corporate entities, deceptive
advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job
discrimination, affirmative action, drug testing, and whistle
blowing. Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with
business and medical issues. These include the rights of
animals, the morality of animal experimentation, preserving
endangered species, pollution control, management of
environmental resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to
direct moral consideration, and our obligation to future
generations. Controversial issues of sexual morality include
monogamy vs. polygamy, sexual relations without love,
homosexual relations, and extramarital affairs. Finally, there
are issues of social morality which examine capital
punishment, nuclear war, gun control, the recreational use of
drugs, welfare rights, and racism.
4. References and Further Reading
Anscombe,Elizabeth "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958),
Philosophy, 1958, Vol. 33, reprinted in
her Ethics, Religion and Politics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1981).
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Barnes, Jonathan,
ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic (New York:
Dover Publications, 1946).
Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789), in The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by
John Bowring (London: 1838-1843).
Hare, R.M., Moral Thinking, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981).
Hare, R.M., The
Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952).
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, ed., E. Curley, (Chicago,
IL: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740),
eds. David Fate Norton, Mary J. Norton (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals, tr, James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1985).
Locke, John, Two Treatises, ed., Peter Laslett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, second edition,
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).
Mackie, John L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,
(New York: Penguin Books,
1977).
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, in Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill,
ed., J.M. Robson (London: Routledge and Toronto, Ont.:
University of Toronto Press, 1991).
Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1903).
Noddings, Nel, "Ethics from the Stand Point Of Women", in
Deborah L. Rhode, ed., Theoretical Perspectives on
Sexual Difference (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1990).
Ockham, William of, Fourth Book of the Sentences,
tr. Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to
William Ockham (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988).
Plato, Republic, 6:510-511, in Cooper, John M., ed.,
Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997).
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1762),
tr. Of the Law of Nature and Nations.
Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta
legem naturalem (1673), tr., The Whole Duty of Man
according to the Law of Nature (London, 1691).
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trs. J.
Annas and J. Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Stevenson, Charles L., The Ethics of Language, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
Sumner, William Graham, Folkways (Boston: Guinn,
1906).
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